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Abstract
The significant presence of Norwegian citizens in Svalbard has subdued the misperception that
Norway’s northernmost territory has an international or internationalized legal status. Now this
Norwegian presence in the archipelago is about to change. Amid tumbling coal prices, the state-
owned mining company Store Norske has shrunk to a minimum, and no current or proposed
business in Longyearbyen has the potential to compensate for the loss of Norwegian workers, in
part due to their international character and recruitment policies. This study argues that the likely
further dilution of Norwegians in Longyearbyen may ultimately fuel misperceptions about the legal
status of Svalbard and pose new foreign and security policy challenges to Norway.
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1. Introduction
At 788 North, the settlement of Longyearbyen marks Norway’s resolve to assert
sovereignty over Svalbard, a group of islands scattered roughly halfway between
the Norwegian mainland and the North Pole. The settlement of approx. 2,000
inhabitants is a family-based society and features a 2,200-meter paved airstrip, a
deep-sea port, hotels, fine-dining restaurants, cafes, kindergartens, a school, a grocery
store, and numerous sports equipment stores.
For decades, the Norwegian government has stressed the importance of having
a substantial presence in these islands littoral to the Arctic Ocean.1 In a policy
document issued in 2010, for instance, the government stated that ‘‘it is the
Government’s position that the assertion of Norwegian sovereignty is best served
with a permanent presence of Norwegian citizens. Maintaining a Norwegian
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settlement in Svalbard has been, and continues to be, an objective for the Norwegian
authorities’’.2 Similarly, the latest government policy document on Svalbard, issued
in 2016, affirms that ‘‘one of the objectives of the policy on Svalbard is to maintain a
Norwegian society in the archipelago. This objective is achieved through the family-
based community of Longyearbyen’’.3
In 20142016, Longyearbyen was hit by an unprecedented crisis. The corners-
tone of Norwegian presence in Svalbard since 1916, Store Norske Spitsbergen
Kulkompani (or Store Norske4), announced that it would cease most of its coal
mining operations. A sharp drop in coal prices, from $125 per ton in 2011 to
less than half this price by the end of 2014, and a political reluctance to
maintain subsidized coal mining while combatting sources of global warming
internationally, resulted in a closure and discontinuation of the mines, which in
turn affected, and continues to affect, the Norwegian presence in the Arctic islands
significantly.5
The purpose of this study is to explore the effects of the Store Norske crisis on
Norway’s ability to imprint its sovereignty over Svalbard. This study explains the
Longyearbyen dilemma: To maintain the same level of Norwegian presence in
Longyearbyen and Svalbard, the Norwegian government would have to stimulate
businesse alternatives to coal mining. However, these alternatives, being education
and research, tourism, and/or a local seafood industry, are likely to attract more non-
Norwegians to the islands and hence dilute the share of Norwegian citizens in
Longyearbyen and Svalbard.
Either way, given the government’s notion that ‘‘the assertion of Norwegian
sovereignty is best served with a permanent presence of Norwegian citizens’’, the
drastic changes in the Longyearbyen population could arguably affect Norway’s
assertion of sovereignty over Svalbard in the decades to come.
1.1 Background
Longyearbyen has been a Norwegian settlement ever since Store Norske purchased
the mining operations of the U.S. Arctic Coal Company in 1916, while the islands
were still considered a no-man’s land.6 The Norwegian mining presence in Long-
yearbyen became relevant when the sovereignty issue was debated at the Paris
Peace Conference following World War I. The negotiations resulted in the 1920
Treaty Concerning Spitsbergen,7 initially signed by the twelve state parties present in
Paris and later acceded to by 32 more (bringing the total up to 44 treaty parties).8
Article 1 established that Norway has ‘‘the full and absolute sovereignty’’ over all
islands that comprise the archipelago. In 1925, as the treaty entered into force,
Norway named Svalbard (hitherto called the Spitsbergen Islands) an inseparable part
of the kingdom.
Since then, Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard has only briefly touched the
political agenda. During World War II, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov
demanded that the southernmost island of Svalbard, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), be
transferred to the Soviet Union and that the rest of the archipelago come under a
Russo-Norwegian condominium.9 In the early 1970s, the Norwegian government
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took several steps to strengthen its ability to exercise national jurisdiction in Svalbard.
The airport in Longyearbyen was built, Sysselmannen (the Governor of Svalbard) was
equipped with a helicopter, and, in 1975, the government purchased all shares
in Store Norske to secure national ownership and control over Longyearbyen.10
Nevertheless, international newspapers suggested that Norway struggled to maintain
its sovereignty over the islands. For example, the New York Times claimed that
the Soviet Union still sought a Russo-Norwegian condominium,11 and a Danish
newspaper asserted that ‘‘the Soviet’s grip on Svalbard is as tight as Norway’s’’.12 At
the time, the Soviet Union ran two large settlements  Barentsburg and Pyramiden 
that were widely perceived as Soviet enclaves in Svalbard. The population
of the two settlements outnumbered those of the Norwegian settlements Long-
yearbyen, Ny-A˚lesund and Svea combined until 1998, when Pyramiden was
abandoned.13
Despite the Soviet Union’s, and later Russia’s, coalmining presence in
Svalbard, Norway has established a firm ability to exercise national jurisdiction,
which is a vital and central feature of state sovereignty.14 Sysselmannen reigns over
two Super Puma helicopters on round-the-clock stand-by, the 88.5-meter ice-
reinforced vessel MS ‘‘Polarsyssel’’ and a staff of 37 police officers and other
public servants  as well as a stash of snow cats, snowmobiles, light boats and
other vehicles.15 In many ways, Longyearbyen and Svalbard resemble mainland
Norwegian towns and counties more than ever before, and Sysselmannen hardly
hesitates to enforce Norwegian jurisdiction within the remaining Russian settle-
ment.16 The population of the Norwegian settlements now outnumbers the
Barentsburg population fourfold.17
However, from time to time, Norway’s sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction is still
implicitly questioned or subtly challenged. For example, in 2008 the Russian patrol
vessel ‘‘Mikula’’ made a surprise port call in Barentsburg, without prior diplomatic
clearance.18 The move was arguably a violation of Norwegian territory, as foreign
state-owned or -operated vessels need to obtain permission through diplomatic
channels months in advance. In July 2013, a Russian government commission chaired
by Vice Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich debated whether to station a Russian
government rescue vessel in Svalbard,19 apparently defying Norway’s sovereignty over
the archipelago. Indeed, some Russian government documents still refer to ‘‘the
international legal status’’ of Svalbard.20
Important trade partners and close allies of Norway have also implied that the legal
status of Svalbard and the surrounding maritime areas are somehow unclear or
unsettled. In the 1990s and 2000s, Iceland and Spain made claims that suggested
that Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard did not qualify Norway as a coastal state
under international law, although their claims were not further substantiated.21
Some European Union (EU) politicians have argued that EU should introduce
its own regulations and/or push for the introduction of international treaties for
waters surrounding Svalbard, within established maritime areas under Norwegian
jurisdiction.22
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1.2 Theories and scholarly work
Explaining the legal status of Svalbard is simple, yet complex. On the one hand,
its legal status follows from legal theory and international law. Scholars of juris-
prudence interpret and weigh the different sources of international law, notably
custom, treaties, judicial decisions and writings, and give qualified opinions on the
matter. Scholars of jurisprudence are usually associated with a positivist tradition of
scientific research. On the other hand, it seems evident that the perceptions about the
legal status of Svalbard held by a substantial number of lay policymakers arise
from quite different sources than those of jurisprudence. Their perceptions differ from
legal opinions and sometimes question or challenge Norway’s exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over Svalbard. This accentuates a constructivist approach to the social
construction of sovereignty and a social theory for how perceptions are shaped.
Most contemporary scholars of jurisprudence agree on one fundamental issue:23
Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago is firmly established in international
law. This legal status follows from international customary law as well as the
Svalbard Treaty and is universally recognized through acquiescence.24 Codified by
the Svalbard Act of 1925, Svalbard is an integrated part of the Kingdom of Norway. A
number of scholars argue that Norwegian sovereignty is restricted by the provisions of
the Svalbard Treaty, which covers military utilization, taxation, the equal rights of all
nationals to mining, hunting and fishing, and more.25 The Mining Ordinance, laid
down by Royal Decree in 1925 in accordance with the Svalbard Treaty, facilitates
Russian mining operations in Svalbard. Other treaty provisions inhibit the application
of certain parts of Norwegian legislation, including the Immigration Act. However,
most scholars of jurisprudence agree that the Svalbard Treaty and the Mining
Ordinance do not affect the exclusive competence of Norway, only how it may be
exercised.
The most prominent disagreement among scholars of jurisprudence concerns the
application of Svalbard Treaty provisions to areas beyond the territory of Svalbard,
i.e. to maritime areas surrounding the archipelago. Weighing different principles of
treaty theory, some stress that the provisions explicitly apply only to the land and the
territorial waters of Svalbard. 26 Others interpret the treaty differently and maintain
that the provisions also apply by analogy to the 200 nautical mile zone and the
continental shelf surrounding the islands,27 which would provide foreign companies
with essentially the same rights as Norwegian companies to utilize fish, oil and gas,
while at the same time limiting the Norwegian government’s ability to tax them.
However, both sides seem to agree that Norway’s competence is exclusive. Geir
Ulfstein, a prominent representative on one side of the debate, states that Norwegian
sovereignty is ‘‘sufficiently based upon effective occupation’’ and ‘‘is supported by its
undisputed status as well as its express recognition by a number of states through the
Svalbard Treaty’’. Similarly, Carl August Fleisher, a distinguished representative on
the other side, finds that ‘‘there is no doubt about Norway’s sovereignty. Today, the
sovereignty also rests on prolonged Norwegian administration and exercise of
sovereignty over the area’’.28
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While most scholars of jurisprudence regard the sovereignty issue as determined
and recognize Norwegian jurisdiction as exclusive, this study finds that laypeople often
tend to perceive the legal status as unsettled, international or internationalized. This
divergence in understanding can be related to how subjective and inter-subjective
ideas are shaped and constructed (arguably, it is fair to say that legal opinions are also
social constructs). As noted by Alexander Wendt, social facts are facts only by human
agreement.29
Sovereignty is a key concept for many political scientists and has received
considerable attention, particularly from scholars of social theory, in recent years.
To some, sovereignty is a prime example of a social construct in international
relations.30 Summarized by Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, constructivists see
sovereignty as an ‘‘intersubjectively shared and socially constructed institution or
normative structure among states’’.31 Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, for
instance, assert that sovereignty is ‘‘a political entity’s externally recognized right to
exercise final authority over its affairs’’ and add that ‘‘by granting and withholding
recognition, international society participates in the social construction of sovereign
states’’.32 They also stress the importance of internal factors, such as cultural
practices, and see all aspects of sovereignty, including territory, population and
authority, as socially constructed.
Roxanne Lynn Doty highlights the meaning of ‘‘the nation’’ in her discussions on
sovereignty. She states that ‘‘[w]hen it is no longer clear who makes up the nation, a
state’s internal sovereignty and the existence of the state itself is threatened’’.33
Relating this argument to Svalbard, although the archipelago is clearly not a separate
nation state, one could argue that demographic changes in its largest settlement,
Longyearbyen, which has arguably moved from being a predominantly Norwegian to
a more international settlement, could ultimately affect internal sovereignty as the
composition of the population changes. Similarly, the presence of a parallel ‘‘nation’’
in Svalbard  the Russian settlement of Barentsburg  also becomes relevant to
discussions on internal sovereignty, as does Stephen Krasner’s concept of domestic
sovereignty, because each of these factors may reduce the effectiveness of Norwegian
control within Svalbard.34 Doty notes that national identity is in a constant process of
being constructed and reconstructed. Large shifts in the composition of a given
population may have significant effects on its national identity. She argues that
massive population movements with an influx of ‘‘elements from the ‘outside’’’
raise questions of ‘‘who should be considered on the ‘inside’, that is, the people.’’35
Indeed, states where sovereignty is more juridical than empirical have been termed
‘‘quasi-states’’ by Robert Jackson.36
Particularly relevant to this study are the works of Robert Jervis, a constructivist
pioneer in the field of foreign policy analysis. He offers a theory of how social facts
are maintained and reinforced. In his classic Perception and Misperception in
International Politics, Jervis accounts for decision-makers’ tendencies to interpret
new information is a way that reinforces their perceptions rather than questions
them. As for Svalbard, numerous particularities may spike, consolidate and
reinforce misperceptions of an international or internationalized legal status of the
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archipelago.37 This study names some hallmarks specific to Svalbard that may give
rise to social facts, or perceptions, that differ from a widely shared legal opinion
(which again is arguably just a different kind of social fact). If you believe that
Svalbard has an international legal status, you are sure to find distinctive features and
signs that consolidate your view. The tendencies described by Jervis are known within
psychology and cognitive science as confirmation bias.
2. Longyearbyen is Changing
The composition of the Longyearbyen population is changing. The settlement,
which was virtually an all-Norwegian company town before local public services spun
off from Store Norske in January 1993,38 has experienced a significant and steady
influx of non-Norwegians in recent years. The share of non-Norwegian citizens has
risen, from negligible in the early 1990s,39 to 26 percent of the population in 2016.40
In 2015 alone, the net immigration of non-Norwegians was 47, whereas the net
emigration of Norwegians was 89.41
The population change is rather easy to explain: During the company town years,
most of the Svalbard population was comprised of employees of Store Norske, which
recruited its staff mainly from the North Norwegian counties of Nordland and
Troms. Naturally, Norwegian was the only working language in Longyearbyen. The
current and far more diverse employers in Longyearbyen, however, hire workers
from all over the world. For instance, the staff at the University Center in Svalbard
(UNIS), which was established in 1993 and has grown into one of the single largest
employers in the settlement, has an equal share of Norwegians and non-Norwegians.
Its student mass is even more international. In 2014, only one in three students was
Norwegian.42 The teaching language at the institution is English.
As the mining industry has shrunk and other activities have grown, the English
language has entered new social and cultural arenas. Local clubs and associations
have switched from Norwegian to English as more non-Norwegian speakers have
joined.43 Illustratively, SvalbardGuideOpplæringen (SGO), a training program for
local guides, changed from Norwegian to English in 2016.44 In order to reach more
of the Longyearbyen population, which currently consists of citizens from more than
40 nations, the Local Council has made its official webpages available in Norwegian,
English, French, Russian and Thai. Users of social media often post in English on
popular local Facebook pages, such as the Longyearbyen Buy & Sell and Info
pages.45 Since 2016, Sysselmannen has released most of its news in both Norwegian
and English.46
As English and other languages spread to new public arenas, it becomes even
easier and more attractive for non-Norwegian speakers to settle in Longyearbyen.
Thus, the trend of a rising share of non-Norwegians in the Norwegian settlement is
likely to be self-reinforcing. A scenario of an accelerating trend, pushing the share of
Norwegian citizens down to, or even below, 50 percent, is no longer far-fetched.
These changes in the Longyearbyen population contribute to the international
atmosphere of the settlement. Of course, there are also other contributing factors as
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well. Since Svalbard is outside the Schengen Area, flights from the Norwegian
mainland to Svalbard depart from international rather than domestic mainland
terminals. Visas are not required by anyone traveling to the archipelago,47 but
travelers must present their passports both at check-in and at the gate, unlike other
domestic flights. Institutions like Sysselmannen and the Local Council diverge from
institutions found on the Norwegian mainland. National legislation is only partly
applicable to the Svalbard islands. Taxes are low if levied at all, and beer and liquor
rationed. The Norwegian military is virtually absent. So, how can Svalbard be an
inseparable part of Norway when it is so different from the mainland?
The international atmosphere of Longyearbyen is likely to become even more
striking as Store Norske, the main employer of Norwegian citizens, tumbles. The
ramifications could be profound. A 2008 report to the Ministry of Justice concluded
that coalmining continued to be of paramount significance to the Norwegian
presence.48 It estimated that 40 percent of all jobs in Longyearbyen and Svea would
be lost if coalmining were discontinued. The number of children in Longyearbyen
would be roughly halved, which would threaten Longyearbyen as a family-based
society. The report also argued that public and private services would deteriorate.49
As of September 2016, the company, which once counted almost 1200 employ-
ees,50 had reduced its staff to 118.51 The mining operations in Svea Nord, the
largest-ever mine in Svalbard, closed in 2016, and the development of the
Lunckefjell mine was discontinued the same year, before production even started.
The remaining staff will produce a modest amount of coal from Gruve 7, the only
Norwegian coalmine still in production, maintain company properties, provide
logistical services, and invest in tourism.52
The current crisis in Store Norske may not have the same ramifications as those
envisaged in the 2008 report, but it has nonetheless resulted in a significant and
sudden loss of Norwegian employees in Svalbard. Following the crisis in Store
Norske, the population of Longyearbyen, an explicit objective in the assertion of
Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, will have the smallest share of Norwegian
citizens present in the archipelago in the past hundred years.
3. The Politics of Presence
Svalbard is arguably a land of misunderstandings: Even Norwegian legislators stumble,
having passed a law that regulates the shipment of firearms ‘‘between Norway and
Svalbard’’,53 as if the archipelago were separate from Norway. The interna-
tional atmosphere of Svalbard, which includes the Russian coalmining settlement
Barentsburg and the ‘‘international research village’’54 Ny-A˚lesund, may reinforce a
misperception that Svalbard is something different or separate from Norway.
Solid support in jurisprudence offers only limited comfort to Norway. Sustained
misperceptions about its international status represent a formidable foreign and
security policy challenge. The more ambiguous and unsettled the legal conditions in
Svalbard are perceived to be, the more likely it is that foreign governments will look
for opportunities and explore their interests in the archipelago and the surrounding
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waters. No matter how strong Norway’s sovereignty stands in legal theory; the
mere conception of a political vacuum or dispute over sovereignty could certainly
tempt others to assert more influence here. Illustratively, some Chinese researchers
precondition a ‘‘sovereignty dispute’’ in their plans to conduct research in
Svalbard.55
In a region of significant military-strategic as well as economic interest, a scuffle for
political influence would serve neither Norwegian interests nor the stability in the
region. Episodes, such as the unannounced port call of the Russian state vessel
in 2008 or the initiative to establish a Russian SAR presence in Svalbard in 2013,
are more likely to occur when perceptions of Svalbard as an international or
internationalized area stand strong.
In jurisprudence, presence matters, but only so much: A government must
exercise effective control, or effective occupation, over its entire territory. But this
does not imply the need for permanent settlements in every nook and cranny. A
claim to sovereignty could be based ‘‘merely upon continued display of authority’’,
which involves the ‘‘intention and will to act as a sovereign, and some actual exercise
or display of such authority’’, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
ruled in the Eastern Greenland case in 1933. Hence, all it would take for Norway
to assert sovereignty in Svalbard is a Governor and a few deputies, one scholar of
jurisprudence has argued.56
In politics, presence arguably matters in more ways. Presence communicates an
interest, signals a commitment, ensures effective monitoring and influence, and/or
deters interference from others. Size also matters. In Svalbard, a substantial and
permanent presence of Norwegian citizens has been a means to address international
misperceptions about Svalbard among laypeople. It also aligns ‘‘the nation’’ with the
sovereign and strengthens internal as well as domestic sovereignty, to borrow terms
from constructivist scholars. As argued above, the differentness and unique hallmarks
of Svalbard may already have fueled notions of the archipelago as an international or
internationalized territory. Such misperceptions, in turn, could arguably precede
situations and episodes that may escalate and ultimately threaten peace and stability
in the region.
Therefore, the crisis that has hit Store Norske has security ramifications. At the
same time, maintaining the presence of Norwegian citizens in Svalbard may prove
easier said than done. To maintain the same level of Norwegian presence in
Longyearbyen and Svalbard, the Norwegian government would have to succeed in
stimulating business alternatives to coal mining. However, these alternatives,
identified as education and research, the tourist industry and/or seafood proces-
sing,57 are likely to attract even more non-Norwegians to the islands and hence dilute
the share of Norwegians in Longyearbyen and Svalbard even further.
As already noted, the steady growth in research and higher education in Svalbard is
one of the most important drivers for the population changes in Longyearbyen in
recent years. UNIS, the largest actor in this field, recruits its staff internationally, as
the pool of competent national candidates is limited.58 Only one in three students
is a Norwegian citizen. An increased national commitment to research and higher
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education in Svalbard seems to be the fastest way to dilute the Norwegian presence
further and to substitute Norwegian with English in even more social and cultural
arenas in Longyearbyen. Norwegian research funds earmarked Svalbard, such as the
Research Council of Norway’s Arctic Field Grant and Svalbard Strategic Grant,59
have increasingly stimulated foreign research activities as well. Without a more
targeted recruitment policy for UNIS and/or Svalbard research funding policy,
research and higher education will continue to add an international sheen to
Longyearbyen and Svalbard.
Tourism, subject to great seasonal variation, will not provide for a significant and
permanent presence of Norwegians in Longyearbyen either. Seasonal and short-term
contracts tend to appeal less to generally well-off Norwegians, and employers favor
staff whose first language skills reflect their international clientele. The Norwegian
government will find it at least as hard to change the recruitment practices of the
multi-national tourism industry, composed of numerous private enterprises, as those
of UNIS. Although Norwegian companies still outnumber foreign companies in
Longyearbyen, government incentives to increase the influx of tourists are just as
likely to stimulate the growth of foreign operators, as they have the capability to reach
and tap new markets.
Some, including the Longyearbyen Local Council, have suggested that establish-
ment of a local seafood industry could compensate for the decline of Store Norske in
Longyearbyen and Svalbard. However, a seafood business would do little to substitute
the loss of Norwegian workers in Svalbard. The industry struggles with poor
profitability and depends on cheap labor. To stay competitive, Norwegian seafood
businesses  already faced with the highest wages in the world60  recruit mostly
foreign workers to their factories. ‘‘A significant share of the employees in the seafood
industry comes from abroad,’’ concludes a Norwegian Official Report from 2014.
Although the exact share is difficult to estimate, the report refers to a 2011 study that
puts the share of non-Norwegians in the industry at more than 30 percent. Seasonal
work, short contracts, hard and manual work, and low wages make the industry
unattractive to most Norwegian workers.61 Rune Myrseth, the CEO of Eterni Norge,
confirms that the mainland seafood industry ‘‘usually recruits employees outside
Norway’’.62 The Norwegian Official Report concludes that the Norwegian govern-
ment has little opportunity to influence or change the recruitment policies of the
seafood industry on mainland Norway. In Svalbard, where work and residence
permits are not required, this could prove even harder.
Ultimately, if the objective of the Norwegian government is to strengthen the
presence of Norwegian citizens in Longyearbyen, it faces a ‘‘damned if you do,
damned if you don’t’’ conundrum. Herein lies the Longyearbyen dilemma: Doing
nothing could result in a dwindling population, where the share of Norwegians most
likely would continue to decline. Putting effort into stimulating other activities and
businesses, such as research and higher education, tourism, and seafood processing,
would incentivize population growth, but the share of Norwegians in Longyearbyen
would most likely be diluted even faster. Either way, Longyearbyen and the presence
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of Norwegians will most likely play a lesser role in Norway’s assertion of sovereignty
over Svalbard in the decades to come.
More positive for the government, a more diverse population in Svalbard makes
the Russian presence in the archipelago less special. The presence of citizens from
across the world dilutes the ‘‘special status’’ that Russia claims to have had in
Svalbard. Given the archipelago’s international atmosphere, Russia will be less likely
to repeat previous attempts to turn Svalbard into a bilateral matter, and Norway will
be better positioned politically to resist Russian advances.
Furthermore, the presence of Norwegian citizens in Longyearbyen is not the
only tool in the Norwegian government’s toolbox. Previous studies have already
concluded that the government’s rule on Svalbard is becoming incrementally
firmer.63 Compensating for a reduced dominance of Norwegian citizens in Long-
yearbyen, the government could lean more heavily on other instruments to deflect
misperceptions and assert its sovereignty over Svalbard, including resorting to a more
active and noticeable exercise of prescriptive, enforcement and judicial jurisdiction.
Reducing the differentness of Svalbard, arguably a source to misperceptions about
its legal status, could ultimately avert foreign governments from prodding for
opportunities or asserting influence in the archipelago.
4. Conclusions
Concerning the legal status of Svalbard, (at least) two sets of ‘‘realities’’ co-exist. One
follows largely from international law and legal theory and deems the status as settled
and final. Scholars of jurisprudence find Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago
to be firmly established and Norwegian jurisdiction to be exclusive, although they
still debate, at least to some extent, whether Norway’s sovereign rights in adjacent
maritime areas are conditional on the provisions of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty.
A different ‘‘reality’’ feeds on other sources than international law. This study finds
that some policymakers and laypeople seem to assume the legal status of Svalbard to
be unsettled, international or internationalized. This study argues that one source of
this perception is the international atmosphere of the archipelago, including liberal
immigration regulations, tax-free shopping, and the departures to Svalbard through
international gates  hallmarks that at least to some extent are consequences of
the said Svalbard Treaty, which paradoxically also recognize Norway’s ‘‘full and
absolute sovereignty’’ over Svalbard. Those who perceive the legal status as unsettled,
international or internationalized, are likely to have their views consolidated by
Svalbard’s international hallmarks, in accordance with the logic described by Robert
Jervis and the cognitive tendency of confirmation bias.
Longyearbyen, the administrative capital of Svalbard, has been one of the most
important instruments in the assertion of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. The
Norwegian government has explicitly stated that the presence of Norwegian citizens
in Longyearbyen serves this purpose. However, the Norwegian presence is changing,
at it is changing fast. The current crisis in Store Norske, the main employer of
Norwegians in Longyearbyen since 1916, has reduced the share of Norwegians and
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altered the composition of Longyearbyen significantly. Using the terms of Roxanne
Doty, the current influx of elements from the ‘‘outside’’ may raise the question as to
who should be considered ‘‘insiders’’, affecting what she refers to as ‘‘the nation’’ and
ultimately what constructivist scholars describe as internal or domestic sovereignty.
The Norwegian government will find it hard to reinvigorate the Norwegian
presence. The alternatives to Store Norske, widely regarded to be research and
higher education, tourism, and a local seafood industry, will most likely expand the
number of non-Norwegians who settle in Longyearbyen due to the nature and
recruitment policies of these businesses. This study has shown that government
incentives and policies aimed at strengthening the Norwegian presence in Svalbard
seem deemed to attract more foreign workers to Svalbard and hence give the
settlement an even more international atmosphere, contrary to the intention. Making
matters worse for the government, doing nothing to compensate for the loss of
Norwegian workers amid the Store Norske crisis does not solve the Longyearbyen
dilemma, since laissez-faire is likely to consolidate the current trend of a falling
share of Norwegians settled in Longyearbyen and Svalbard. The dilemma seems
impossible to escape with the policy alternatives under consideration by the
Norwegian government.
Due to the Longyearbyen dilemma, a stronger international atmosphere in
Longyearbyen seems inescapable. Isolated, the declining trend in the share of
Norwegians in Svalbard is likely to fuel misperceptions about its legal status.
Misperceptions, which in turn, could tempt other governments to assert more political
influence in Svalbard, which may ultimately affect peace and stability in the region.
NOTES
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